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INTRODUCTION 
GEORGE J. ALEXANDER 
'Within the year, the president of the United States delivered to 
Congress a message dealing with mental health, the first that has ever 
been delivered by an American president. It is but the latest indication 
of the present pervasiveness of concern about the problems of the human 
mind. Doctrinal law has, on the whole, been slow to accommodate itself 
to many of the findings of the sciences. In the area of criminal responsi­
bility, the problem of the lack of communication between law and psy­
chiatry has already been the subject of extensive commentary. Some areas 
remain as yet less incumbered with analysis. 
Whatever may be true of other law schools, many of which Professor 
Smith suggests neglect the mechanics of behavioral courses in family and 
criminal law in favor of courses dealing with the "vested order," the Syra­
cuse College of Law cannot be accused on that ground. The family law 
course has been structured to provide the students with a broad range of 
considerations from the behavioral sciences as a vehicle for the discussion 
of the legal problems. A seminar in criminal law will have the same effect 
for some problems in that field. A further outgrowth of this concern is the 
present symposium. 
Professor Smith's introductory article reminds the reader of many of 
the difficulties which have been faced in attempting to incorporate knowl­
edge obtained by science into the fabric of law. He reminds not only of 
past failures but of present ones and suggests the increasing need for team 
work in the medical-legal area. Between law and science, the whole fabric 
of society may be spun anew, he states. 
Before any spinning can be begun, however, one must face some rather 
meaningful questions with respect to societal responsibility. These in turn 
lead to an examination of the medical and legal ingredients of mental 
abnormality. 
vVe name mental abnormality "mental illness." If this characterization 
results in acts comparable to the freeing of victims from chains, the label 
is salutary. One may question its utility, however, if mental "illness" is 
taken literally as implying that the victim is involved in an involuntary 
condition for the results of which he is at best only indirectly responsible. 
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The problems arising from the application of such sweeping concepts to 
criminal responsibility have been discussed elsewhere at length.1 In part, 
this symposium examines the somewhat broader underpinnings of the the­
ory. How analogous is the diagnosis of "mental illness" to the diagnosis 
of other illness and to what extent is "treatment" in this area a problem 
of a similarly medical nature as the treatment of other illness? Euphemisms, 
if indeed "mental illness" is in part a euphemism, have been known to 
have unfortunate results in the past. 
The symposium examines the medico-legal role of the psychiatrist 
from two standpoints. The first role examined is the diagnostic role in 
which a psychiatrist identifies mental condition for legal purposes. A psy­
chiatrist may, for example, make a medico-legal determination of the mental 
competence of a person: to contract, to devise property, to manage property, 
to walk the streets freely, or, analogously, to commit a crime, stand trial 
for its commission and even be executed for it. 
Courts allow psychiatric testimony on such issues and others not men­
tioned, because the legal standard applicable to people suffering mental 
derangement differs from one applicable to others.2 If mental illness is 
<:apable of scientific determination, law would be presumptuous in accept­
ing a non-medical answer as sufficient. If, on the other hand, the answer 
is partially normative, other results may follow. Furthermore, if the diag­
nosis is accomplished by methodology which requires less expertise than, 
for example, x-ray interpretation, and leads to more dubious results, may 
a trend toward greater psychiatric determination be judicial abdication 
of responsibility? Dr. Leifer's article sheds light on this difficult question 
from the standpoint of a psychiatrist. 
The other role examined is the role of the psychiatrist in the treatment 
of mental disorder. If a person is ill he should, normally, be treated by 
a physician. Even such an apparent truism may fail, however, to explain 
the desiratum in the mental area. One can hardly doubt that the law 
legitimately leaves the problem of treating contagious diseases to physicians. 
Can the same be said of leaving deviant behavior to psychiatric treatment? 
Does it, matter whether psychiatry is capable of "treating" in the same 
sense? Is it possible that where deviant behavior raises societal problems, 
these must be shared by both the legal and medical professions and that 
any firm line between the responsibility for "correction" in the normative 
sense and "treatment" in the medical sense is artificial? Dr. Thomas' ar­
ticle deals with this problem, from the dual viewpoint of a psychiatrist 
and a law teacher. 
Adoption of scientific knowledge into law does not depend as much 
on the status of the experts in the field as on the knowledge accumulated. 
1. One of the latest symposia is the excellent one in 57 Nw. U.L. Rev. 1 (1962). 
2. For specific references see Tables, prepared by staff under K. V. Alexander, in 
Lindman &: McIntyre, The Mentally Disabled and the Law (1961). 
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Quite aside from the question of the role of the psychiatrist in the deter­
mination of questions is the role of knowledge of human behavior on the 
principles of law. Few areas of law fail to make assumptions about human 
behavior; many of them are questionable in terms of the accepted scientific 
thought. Perhaps, to accomplish the reweaving of the societal fabric, it 
will be necessary to view and review large areas of legal doctrines in terms 
of acquired information. One area considered ripe for such reexamination 
is the area of compensation for psychic injury. Courts have, from the 
initial position of Mitchell v. Rochester Ry.3 come a long way in finding 
cause to allow compensation for psychic injury.4 In part, this change has 
been the result of the increased manageability of the information once 
thought so speculative as to be beyond control by courts.6 Professor Smith 
analyzes the important problem of this type of injury from the focal point 
of evidentiary problems. 
The issue is, however, not entirely theoretical. The practitioner will 
find in it many useful suggestions applicable to his practice. Professor Smith 
gives helpful suggestions with respect to trial of psychic injury cases, going 
so far as to suggest arguments to the jury in some cases. Dr. Leifer's article 
will probably be of help to those practitioners who find themselves in the 
uncomfortable position of being forced to cross-examine an unfavorable 
psychiatric witness and explain his testimony to the jury. Dr. Thomas' article 
will, undoubtedly, also be helpful. Furthermore, the authors suggest several 
significant innovations. Professor Smith suggests the possibility of a medico­
legal audit as a means of avoiding the battle of experts in medical injury 
cases. Dr. Thomas suggests a campus clinic as a means of dealing with the 
dangerous offender. These suggestions, as well as the theory which under­
lies them, commend themselves to the careful scrutiny of the bar and the 
teaching profession. 
As is true with any symposium with a broad base and comparatively 
small space, the articles in this issue only hint at broad areas that remain 
to be analyzed. If the problems have been forcefully posed the issue has 
fulfilled its purpose. 
3. 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896). 
4. Halio v. Lurie, 15 App. Div. 2d 62, 222 N.Y.S.2d 759 (2d Dep't 1961); Battalla v. 
State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 176 N.E.2d 729, 219 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1961); Ferrara v. Galluchio, 5 
N.Y.2d 16, 152 N.E.2d 249, 176 N.Y.S.2d 996 (1958); d. Gonsenhauser v. New York Cent. 
R.R.,8 App. Div. 2d ·i83, 188 N.Y.S.2d 901 (4th Dep't 1959) (extending doctrine to cows). 
5. Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896). 
